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The (Reform) Treaty of Lisbon:  
What’s in it? How Significant?
♣
Finn Laursen
 
 
 ♦
The Lisbon Treaty has retained most of the institutional changes of the Constitutional Treaty (de 
Poncins, 2008; Griller and Ziller, 2008; Sauron, 2008; and Weidenfeld, 2008). It amends the 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 
The European Union is currently based on the treaty framework which emerged as the Treaty of 
Nice entered into force in 2003 (European Union, 2003). The Constitutional Treaty elaborated 
during the Convention on the Future of Europe, 2002-2003, and finally negotiated during the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), 2003-2004, proposed a number of changes in that 
framework, but the treaty was rejected in referenda in France and the Netherlands in May and 
June 2005 (Laursen, 2008). After a reflection period it was decided to negotiate a so-called 
Reform Treaty. The German Presidency played an important role in securing agreement on a 
mandate for a new IGC in June 2007. During the Portuguese Presidency in the autumn of 2007 
that IGC then produced a new treaty, the Lisbon Treaty (European Union 2007).  
In this paper we shall outline the most important provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Will the Lisbon Treaty improve the efficiency, democratic legitimacy “as well as the coherence 
of its external action,” as the mandate from June 2007 claimed it should? (Council of the 
European Union, 2007). 
The Constitutional Treaty would have replaced all existing treaties of the EU by 
one new treaty. The Lisbon Treaty reverts to the classical method of treaty reform, amending the 
existing treaties. For that reason the treaty that was signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007 is 
much more difficult to read than the Constitutional Treaty (Council of the European Union, 
2004). Luckily the consolidated version of the treaties incorporating the Lisbon Treaty, which 
was published in early 2008, is easier to read that the Lisbon Treaty itself (European Union, 
2008). So in this chapter we shall compare the 2003 and 2008 versions of the Union’s 
Consolidated Treaties. 
We should of course add that at the moment we do not know whether the Lisbon 
Treaty will enter into force. It was rejected by the Irish voters in a referendum in June 2008. Most 
likely there will be a second referendum in Ireland in 2009, possibly including some opt-outs for 
Ireland. Given the fact that a large majority of the Member States has ratified the treaty there is a 
chance that the Irish may accept it in a second referendum and it will enter into force. But nothing 
can be taken for granted when it comes to the use of referenda. 
 
The Essentials of the Lisbon Treaty  
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Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), 
the latter being renamed The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). All 
references to symbols of constitutionalism, including flag, anthem and motto, have been removed. 
Legislative acts will not be called laws and framework laws, but retain the old names of 
regulations and directives.  The new post in the Constitutional Treaty of Union Minister for 
Foreign Affairs has been renamed High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR). Nor does the new treaty explicitly say that Union law has primacy, 
although it will have such primacy based on case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
going back to the early years of European integration. The IGC confirmed this in Declaration no. 
17 attached to the treaty: “The Conference recalls that in accordance with well settled case law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the 
basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States, under the conditions laid down 
by the said case law” (European Union, 2008, p. 344, see also Wouters et al., 2008, p. 190).  
  The text of the Charter of Individual Rights is no longer a part of the treaty as it was in 
the Constitutional Treaty, but the Lisbon Treaty says that it “shall have the same legal value as 
the Treaties” (art. 6(1) TEU).  
 
Institutional changes 
 
The Treaty of Nice limited the number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to 732. 
The Treaty of Lisbon increases the number to 751. The exact distribution will be decided by the 
European Council. The number of seats will vary between six and 96. At the moment the EP has 
785 members because of transitional measures in connection with the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements (Sauron, 2008, p. 43, de Poncins, 2008, p. 145). If the Treaty of Lisbon does not 
enter into force before the next election to the European Parliament (EP) in June 2009 732 MEPs 
will be elected instead of 751. 
 
Box 1: Composition of the European Parliament 
Art. 14 TEU (Lisbon) 
(….) 
2. The European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union's citizens. They 
shall not exceed seven hundred and fifty in number, plus the President. Representation of citizens 
shall be degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State. 
No Member State shall be allocated more than ninety-six seats. 
The European Council shall adopt by unanimity, on the initiative of the European Parliament and 
with its consent, a decision establishing the composition of the European Parliament, respecting 
the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. 
  
The Lisbon Treaty retains the provision proposed by the Constitutional Treaty for electing the 
President of the European Council “by a qualified majority, for a term of two and a half years, 
renewable once” (Art. 15(5) TEU). At the same time the European Council officially becomes an 
institution. 
The European Council will among other things determine “the strategic interests 
and objectives of the Union” for all its external action (Art. 22(1) TEU) thus bringing external 
relations and CFSP together. The President of the European Council will also be involved with 
external representation of the Union. The job description of the new post is not very detailed. The 
location and size of the staff is still to be determined.  
 
 
 
   5   
Box 2: Elected President of the European Council 
Article 15 TEU 
(….) 
5.  The European Council shall elect its President, by a qualified majority, for a term of two 
and a half years, renewable once. In the event of an impediment or serious misconduct, the 
European Council can end the President's term of office in accordance with the same procedure. 
6.  The President of the European Council: 
  shall chair it and drive forward its work; 
  shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation 
with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs 
Council; 
  shall endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council; 
  shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the 
European Council. 
The President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external 
representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without 
prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy. 
The President of the European Council shall not hold a national office. 
 
The use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers becomes the norm: “The 
Council shall act by a qualified majority except where the Treaties provide otherwise” (Art. 16(3) 
TEU). This should increase the efficiency of decision-making.  According to one account 33 new 
articles will be based on QMV. With 63 articles already stipulating QMV that brings the total to 
96 articles where decisions can be made by QMV (de Poncins, 2008, p. 201). 
From 2014 the QMV will be defined as “at least 55% of the members of the 
Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 
65% of the population of the Union” (Art. 16(3) TEU). It is also stipulated that a blocking 
minority must include at least four members. 
 
Box 3: Decision Making in the Council 
Art. 16 TEU (Lisbon) 
1. The Council shall, jointly with the European Parliament, exercise legislative and budgetary 
functions. It shall carry out policy-making and coordinating functions as laid down in the 
Treaties. 
(…) 
3. The Council shall act by a qualified majority except where the Treaties provide otherwise. 
4. As from 1 November 2014, a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 % of the 
members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States 
comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union. 
A blocking minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the qualified 
majority shall be deemed attained. 
(….) 
5. The transitional provisions relating to the definition of the qualified majority which shall be 
applicable until 31 October 2014 and those which shall be applicable from 1 November 2014 to 
31 March 2017 are laid down in the Protocol on transitional provisions. 
6. The Council shall meet in different configurations, the list of which shall be adopted in 
accordance with Article 236 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
The General Affairs Council shall ensure consistency in the work of the different Council 
configurations. It shall prepare and ensure the follow-up to meetings of the European Council,   6   
in liaison with the President of the European Council and the Commission. 
The Foreign Affairs Council shall elaborate the Union's external action on the basis of strategic 
guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union's action is consistent. 
(….) 
8. The Council shall meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act. To this 
end, each Council meeting shall be divided into two parts, dealing respectively with deliberations 
on Union legislative acts and non-legislative activities. 
9. The Presidency of Council configurations, other than that of Foreign Affairs, shall be held by 
Member State representatives in the Council on the basis of equal rotation, in accordance with the 
conditions established in accordance with Article 236 of the Treaty on the Functioning of  the 
European Union 
 
The so-called co-decision procedure, whereby the Council and EP act on par in the legislative 
process, each having a veto, becomes “the ordinary legislative procedure” (Art. 294 TFEU). This 
empowers the EP further and should increase the democratic legitimacy of the Union. Co-
decision will be extended to more than 40 new decision areas. It has been suggested that co-
decision will apply to 95% of decisions against 75% at the moment (de Poncins, 2008, p. 148).  
The procedure for designating the President of the Commission changes slightly. 
According to the Treaty of Nice the European Council nominates the President who is then 
approved by the European Parliament. According to the Treaty of Lisbon the European Council 
shall propose a candidate, “taking into account the elections to the European Parliament.” This 
candidate shall then be elected by the European Parliament (EP) (Art. 17(7) TEU).  This is a 
slight step towards a more parliamentary system. But even if the treaty uses the term ‘election’, 
the choice will be determined by the European Council, i.e. the governments of the Member 
States.  
Further, from 2014, “the Commission shall consist of a number of members, 
including its President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member States, unless the European 
Council, acting unanimously, decides to alter this number.” In this future reduced-in-size 
Commission there will be strict equal rotation between the Member States (Art. 17(5) TEU). Thus 
the possibility of retaining a Commissioner per Member States is there. It will require a 
unanimous vote in the European Council. It may become part of a solution to the Irish problem, 
since the Irish did not want to lose an Irish Commissioner. 
 
Box 4: Composition of the Commission 
Art. 17 TEU (Lisbon) 
(….) 
4. The Commission appointed between the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and 
31 October 2014, shall consist of one national of each Member State, including its President and 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who shall be one of 
its Vice-Presidents. 
5. As from 1 November 2014, the Commission shall consist of a number of members, including 
its President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member States, unless the European Council, acting 
unanimously, decides to alter this number. 
The members of the Commission shall be chosen from among the nationals of the Member States 
on the basis of a system of strictly equal rotation between the Member States, reflecting the 
demographic and geographical range of all the Member States. This system shall be established 
unanimously by the European Council in accordance with Article 244 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. 
(.…)   7   
7. Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the 
appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to 
the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall be 
elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members. If he does not 
obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall within 
one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the European Parliament following 
the same procedure. 
The Council, by common accord with the President-elect, shall adopt the list of the other persons 
whom it proposes for appointment as members of the Commission. They shall be selected, on the 
basis of the suggestions made by Member States, in accordance with the criteria set out in 
paragraph 3, second subparagraph, and paragraph 5, second subparagraph. 
The President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and 
the other members of the Commission shall be subject as a body to a vote of consent by the 
European Parliament. On the basis of this consent the Commission shall be appointed by the 
European Council, acting by a qualified majority. 
8. The Commission, as a body, shall be responsible to the European Parliament. In accordance 
with Article 234 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the European 
Parliament may vote on a motion of censure of the Commission. If such a motion is carried, the 
members of the 
Commission shall resign as a body and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy shall resign from the duties that he carries out in the Commission. 
 
The jurisdiction of the ECJ will be enlarged because of the abolition of the pillar structure, with 
some limitations remaining especially for CFSP. The Court of First Instance becomes the General 
Court and there will also be specialised courts (Art. 19 TEU). 
The national parliaments will have an increased role in the future. According to 
article 12 TEU and Protocol no. 1 on the Role of National Parliaments and Protocol no. 2 on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality they will supervise the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity. If a third of them so requests a draft legislative act 
must be reviewed. In case of proposed legislation concerning the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice a quarter of the national Parliaments will be sufficient. In countries having bicameral 
parliaments each chamber will have one vote. Unicameral parliaments will have two votes. 
 
Division of  Competencies 
 
The call for a catalogue of competences from especially the German Länder at the time of the 
Treaty of Nice negotiations led to the inclusion of the issue in the post-Nice agenda and the 
European Convention produced a list of different kinds of competences. The Lisbon Treaty 
includes such listing of different kinds of competences. Some competences are exclusive, 
including the customs union and common commercial policy. But most common policies, 
including the internal market, the Common Agricultural Policy, social policy and environment 
policy are shared competences. Coordination of economic policies constitutes a separate category 
(art. 5 TFEU), and so do supporting actions for some policies which basically remain national, 
such as health, industry, culture and education (Art. 6 TFEU). All this may constitute a 
clarification, but it does not really change matters.  
 
Box 5: Exclusive competences 
Article 3 TFEU 
1. The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: 
(a) customs union; 
(b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market;   8   
(c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro; 
(d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; 
(e) common commercial policy. 
2. The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international 
agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to 
enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect 
common rules or alter their scope. 
 
 
Box 6: Shared competences 
Article 4 TFEU 
1. The Union shall share competence with the Member States where the Treaties confer on it a 
competence which does not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 3 and 6. 
2. Shared competence between the Union and the Member States applies in the following 
principal areas: 
(a) internal market; 
(b) social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty; 
(c) economic, social and territorial cohesion; 
(d) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources; 
(e) environment; 
(f) consumer protection; 
(g) transport; 
(h) trans-European networks; 
(i) energy; 
(j) area of freedom, security and justice; 
(k) common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this Treaty. 
3. In the areas of research, technological development and space, the Union shall have 
competence 
to carry out activities, in particular to define and implement programmes; however, the exercise 
of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs. 
4. In the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have 
competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy; however, the exercise of that 
competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs. 
 
 
Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice 
 
The Maastricht Treaty included a third pillar that dealt with Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
cooperation. Like the second pillar, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it was 
intergovernmental cooperation. Decisions normally required unanimity. The role of the 
Commission was very limited and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was largely excluded. The 
Amsterdam Treaty started moving some of JHA to the first pillar, thus introducing the 
Community method, with majority voting and increased roles for the Commission and the ECJ. 
The treaty introduced the concept of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The 
Treaty of Nice reinforced this trend towards using the Community method for JHA, but Criminal 
Justice and Police cooperation stayed in the third pillar. The Lisbon Treaty formally abolishes the 
pillar structure and the Community method will to a large extend also be used for Criminal 
Justice and Police cooperation in the future. The Lisbon Treaty includes border checks, asylum 
and migration (Art. 77-88 TFEU), judicial cooperation in civil matters (art. 81 TFEU), judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters (Art. 82-86 TFEU) and police cooperation (Art. 87-89 TFEU) 
under AFSJ.   9   
 
External Action 
 
As mentioned earlier the Lisbon Treaty formally abolishes the pillar structure. CFSP, the old 
second pillar, however will largely remain intergovernmental even after the formal abolishment 
of the pillar structure.  
  The existing pillar structure creates problems of coherence between external relations of 
the Community (1
st  pillar) and CFSP (2
nd
Box 7: External Action Objectives 
  pillar). In the past only the Community had legal 
personality. The Lisbon Treaty attributes legal personality to the Union as a whole (Art. 47 TEU). 
So in the future the Union will also be able to enter into international agreements under CFSP. 
The new High Representative will deal with both external economic relations of the Union, in his 
capacity of Vice-President of the Commission, as well as CFSP, in his capacity of High 
Representative and as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council (Art. 27(1) TEU). This should be 
seen as an effort to increase coherence in external action in general. 
  The new TEU has a longer list of external action objectives than the existing treaties. 
They are listed in the section on external action so they include both external economic relations, 
including trade, development and humanitarian aid, as well as CFSP. Including this list in the new 
external action section of the treaty means for instance that the EU will have to work to 
consolidate human rights in its commercial policy. 
 
Treaty of Nice (consolidated)  Treaty of Lisbon Lisbon (consolidated 
CFSP  External Action 
Article 11 TEU 
 
1. The Union shall define and implement a 
common foreign and security policy covering 
all areas of foreign and security policy, the 
objectives of which shall be: 
—  to safeguard the common values, 
fundamental interests, independence and 
integrity of the Union in conformity with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter, 
— to strengthen the security of the Union in all 
ways,  
—  to preserve peace and strengthen 
international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter, as 
well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act 
and the objectives of the Paris Charter, 
including those on external borders, 
— to promote international cooperation, 
— to develop and consolidate democracy and 
the rule of law, and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. 
 
Article 21 TEU 
(….) 
2.  The Union shall define and pursue 
common policies and actions, and shall work 
for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of 
international relations, in order to: 
  safeguard its values, fundamental interests, 
security, independence and integrity; 
  consolidate and support democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and the principles of 
international law; 
  preserve peace, prevent conflicts and 
strengthen international security, in accordance 
with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter, with the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the 
Charter of Paris, including those relating to 
external borders; 
  foster the sustainable economic, social and 
environmental development of developing 
countries, with the primary aim of eradicating 
poverty; 
  encourage the integration of all countries into 
the world economy, including through  the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on 
international trade; 
  help develop international measures to preserve 
and improve the quality of the environment and  10   
the sustainable management of global natural 
resources, in order to ensure sustainable 
development; 
  assist populations, countries and regions 
confronting natural or man-made disasters; and 
  promote an international system based on 
stronger multilateral cooperation and good 
global governance. 
 
 
Common Commercial Policy 
 
Common Commercial Policy remains a central part of the Union’s external action. It has been an 
exclusive competence since the Treaty of Rome (Art. 113). The Commission negotiates trade 
deals multilaterally within the GATT – and now WTO - as well as bilaterally with third countries. 
Decisions can be made in the Council by a QMV. The ECJ has jurisdiction. In other words, the 
Community method is applied for commercial policy. Interestingly enough, the original article 
113 did not mention the European Parliament. 
  The original  treaty basically covered trade in goods. But some international treaties 
included matters where the Member States remained competent. They were so-called mixed 
agreements. For such agreements procedural rules are more complicated. Such agreements, for 
instance, also require national ratification. 
  The Uruguay Round extended the international trade agenda to include services and trade 
related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPS). The ECJ in 1994 decided that these new areas 
were partly national competence. 
  In the treaty reforms that followed there was an effort to extend the definition of trade to 
include services and intellectual property. They were included by the Treaty of Amsterdam, but 
decisions had to be by unanimity. The Treaty of Nice introduced  QMV for services and 
intellectual property. But “cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and 
human health services” would still require unanimity (Art. 133 TEC). 
  The Treaty of Lisbon retains QMV for services and intellectual property, and extends it 
to the new category of foreign direct investment. However, it retains unanimity for cultural and 
audiovisual services (“where these agreements risk prejudicing the Union’s cultural and linguistic 
diversity”) as well as social, education and health services (“where these agreements risk 
seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility 
of Member States to deliver them”). Finally the Lisbon Treaty introduces the ordinary legislative 
procedure for commercial policy, thus giving the EP a much stronger role in commercial policy 
(Art. 207 TFEU). Making the EP a co-legislator in commercial policy is one of the more 
important innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Box 8: Scope of and Decision-Making for Commercial Policy 
Treaty of Nice  Treaty of Lisbon 
Article 133 TEC 
1. The common commercial policy shall be 
based on uniform principles, particularly in 
regard tochanges in tariff rates, the conclusion 
of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement 
of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, 
export policy and measures to protect trade 
such as those to be taken in the event of 
Art. 207 TFEU 
1. The common commercial policy shall be 
based on uniform principles, particularly with 
regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion 
of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade 
in goods and services, and the commercial 
aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct 
investment, the achievement of uniformity in  11   
dumping or subsidies. 
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to 
the Council for implementing the common 
commercial policy. 
3. Where agreements with one or more States 
or international organisations need to be 
negotiated, the Commission shall make 
recommendations to the Council, which shall 
authorise the Commission to open the 
necessary negotiations. The Council and the 
Commission shall be responsible for ensuring 
that the agreements negotiated are compatible 
with internal Community policies and rules. 
The Commission shall conduct these 
negotiations in consultation with a special 
committee appointed by the Council to assist 
the Commission in this task and within the 
framework of such directives as the Council 
may issue to it. The Commission shall report 
regularly to the special committee on the 
progress of negotiations. 
The relevant provisions of Article 300 shall 
apply. 
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it 
by this Article, the Council shall act by a 
qualified majority. 
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall also apply to the 
negotiation and conclusion of agreements in 
the fields of trade in services and the 
commercial aspects of intellectual property, in 
so far as those agreements are not covered by 
the said paragraphs and without prejudice to 
paragraph 6. 
By way of derogation from paragraph 4, the 
Council shall act unanimously when 
negotiating and concluding an agreement in 
one of the fields referred to in the first 
subparagraph, where that agreement includes 
provisions for which unanimity is required for 
the adoption of internal rules or where it relates 
to a field in which the Community has not yet 
exercised the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty by adopting internal rules. 
The Council shall act unanimously with respect 
to the negotiation and conclusion of a 
horizontal 
agreement insofar as it also concerns the 
preceding subparagraph or the second 
subparagraph of paragraph 6. 
This paragraph shall not affect the right of the 
Member States to maintain and conclude 
measures of liberalisation, export policy and 
measures to protect trade such as those to be 
taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The 
common commercial policy shall be conducted 
in the context of the principles and objectives 
of the Union's external action. 
2. The European Parliament and the Council, 
acting by means of regulations in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall 
adopt the measures defining the framework for 
implementing the common commercial policy. 
3. Where agreements with one or more third 
countries or international organisations need to 
be negotiated and concluded, Article 218 shall 
apply, subject to the special provisions of this 
Article. 
The Commission shall make recommendations 
to the Council, which shall authorise it to open 
the necessary negotiations. The Council and the 
Commission shall be responsible for ensuring 
that the agreements negotiated are compatible 
with internal Union policies and rules. 
The Commission shall conduct these 
negotiations in consultation with a special 
committee appointed by the Council to assist 
the Commission in this task and within the 
framework of such directives as the Council 
may issue to it. The Commission shall report 
regularly to the special committee and to the 
European Parliament on the progress of 
negotiations. 
4. For the negotiation and conclusion of the 
agreements referred to in paragraph 3, the 
Council shall act by a qualified majority. 
For the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements in the fields of trade in services and 
the commercial aspects of intellectual property, 
as well as foreign direct investment, the 
Council shall act unanimously where such 
agreements include provisions for which 
unanimity is required for the adoption of 
internal rules. 
The Council shall also act unanimously for the 
negotiation and conclusion of agreements: 
(a) in the field of trade in cultural and 
audiovisual services, where these agreements 
risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and 
linguistic diversity; 
(b) in the field of trade in social, education and 
health services, where these agreements risk 
seriously disturbing the national organisation of  12   
agreements with third countries or international 
organisations in so far as such agreements 
comply with Community law and other 
relevant international agreements. 
6. An agreement may not be concluded by the 
Council if it includes provisions which would 
go beyond the Community's internal powers, in 
particular by leading to harmonisation of the 
laws or regulations of the Member States in an 
area for which this Treaty rules out such 
harmonisation. 
In this regard, by way of derogation from the 
first subparagraph of paragraph 5, agreements 
relating to trade in cultural and audiovisual 
services, educational services, and social and 
human health services, shall fall within the 
shared competence of the Community and its 
Member States. Consequently, in addition to a 
Community decision taken in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of Article 300, the 
negotiation of such agreements shall require 
the common accord of the Member States. 
Agreements thus negotiated shall be concluded 
jointly by the Community and the Member 
States. 
The negotiation and conclusion of international 
agreements in the field of transport shall 
continue to be governed by the provisions of 
Title V and Article 300. 
7. Without prejudice to the first subparagraph 
of paragraph 6, the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament, may extend the application of 
paragraphs 1 to 4 to international negotiations 
and agreements on intellectual property in so 
far as they are not covered by paragraph 5. 
such services and prejudicing the responsibility 
of Member States to deliver them. 
5. The negotiation and conclusion of 
international agreements in the field of 
transport shall be subject to Title VI of Part 
Three and to Article 218. 
(….) 
 
 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
The Union’s CFSP competence remains limited in various ways in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
According to Article 24 TEU there are ‘specific rules and procedures’ for CFSP. Unanimity will 
remain the normal decision rule. Adoption of legislative acts is excluded. And the ECJ normally 
has no jurisdiction. There are two exceptions: The reference to Article 40 means that the ECJ will 
“be empowered to referee disputes over the interface of the Union’s general authority and its 
specific authority relating to the CFSP” (Sieberson, 2008, p. 180). The other exception concerns 
restrictive measures involving individuals. The Maastricht Treaty had introduced procedures for 
adopting sanctions involving both CFSP (the political decision) and the Community (the actual 
sanctions, often involving trade measures). These sanctions were aimed against states. This 
created a problem for sanctions against individuals, so-called ‘smart sanctions’ that the EU may  13   
want to use against terrorists (see Wouters et al., 2008, p. 193). The Lisbon Treaty has a new 
article that allows restrictive measures “against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State 
entities” (Art. 215(2) TFEU). Article 275 TFEU gives the ECJ jurisdiction to review the legality 
of such restrictive measures against natural or legal persons. 
CFSP is not listed in the treaty’s lists of either exclusive or shared competences, 
which for instance mention common commercial policy as an exclusive competence of the Union 
(Art. 3(1) TFEU). Development cooperation and humanitarian aid are mentioned among shared 
competences (Art. 4(4) TFEU). CFSP is mentioned separately as a competence without giving 
this competence a specific name (Art. 2(4) TFEU).  
These various provisions of the new treaty show that despite the formal 
abolishment of the pillar structure there is still an important difference between external 
(economic) relations, falling under the old 1
st pillar, and CFSP, the old 2
nd
Box 9: CFSP competence 
 pillar. The Member 
States were not ready to extend the ‘Community method’ to the latter. So a de facto special CFSP 
pillar will remain. 
 
Article 24 TEU 
(ex Article 11 TEU) 
 
1.  The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all 
areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive 
framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence. 
 
The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be 
defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except 
where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The 
common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the 
Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is 
defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction 
with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with 
Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the 
second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
 
Although the basic decision rule for CFSP is unanimity, there is the possibility of some decisions 
being made by a QMV. Of the four possibilities for QMV mentioned three already exist. The new 
one  is the third possibility mentioned, namely the one where the HR proposes a decision 
following a ‘specific request’ from the European Council (see box 10). 
 
Box 10: Decision making in CFSP 
Article 31 TEU 
(ex Article 23(1) TEU) 
 
1. Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting 
unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall 
be excluded. 
 
When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a 
formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply 
the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity,  14   
the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union 
action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the 
members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the 
Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not 
be adopted. 
 
2.  By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority: 
  when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of 
the European Council relating to the Union’s strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in 
Article 22(1), 
  when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following 
a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High 
Representative, 
  when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position, 
  when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 33. 
If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends 
to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. 
The High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a 
solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, 
request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity. 
3.  The European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act 
by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2. 
4.  Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications. 
5.  For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members. 
 
The treaty also includes so-called ‘constructive abstention’, which goes back to the Amsterdam 
Treaty. Only those voting in favour of a decision are committed. Those abstaining, and explaining 
why, in a declaration, are not committed but accept that the decision commits the Union (Art. 
31(1) TEU). 
The idea that the Council can make implementing decisions by QMV is not new, 
but the Member States have so far hesitated to use the possibility. In Article 31 TEU the 
possibility is linked with a so-called ‘emergency brake’. A state that has ‘vital’ reasons for 
opposing a decision can request that the decision be moved from the Council to the European 
Council for decision by unanimity. There is a tightening here since it used to be ‘important’ 
reasons under the current treaty (UK, House of Commons, 2008, p. 42). On the other hand, the 
article in question also includes a bridging clause – or passerelle - whereby it can be decided by 
unanimity in the European Council to move some area of decision making, beyond the four listed, 
from unanimity to QMV. This does not include defence matters, though. So all in all, a complex 
set of rules. Most likely unanimity will remain the norm. 
Let’s add that the UK secured two Declarations during the IGC 2007, nos. 13 and 
14, which stress the intergovernmental nature of CFSP. Declaration 13 says that the creation of 
the office of the HR and the establishment of an External Action Service “do not affect the 
responsibilities of the Member States as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of 
their foreign policy nor of their national representation in third countries and international 
organisations.” Declaration 14 specifically mentions the Security Council of the United Nations 
and says that the CFSP provisions of the treaty “do not give new powers to the Commission to 
initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European Parliament.” 
The new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) shall 
conduct CFSP and be a Vice-President of the Commission. This has been referred to as double-
hatting. Since he or she will also chair the Foreign Affairs Council (Art. 18(3) TEU) the HR will  15   
actually have three hats. The position is a major innovation. The new HR should become a central 
figure in the external (economic) relations as well as foreign and security policy of the Union. 
Some turf battles with the new permanent President of the European Council as well as the 
President of the Commission can be expected. Further there will also be a General Affairs 
Council to be chaired by the rotating Presidency. Much will depend on the personalities of those 
appointed, and whether some memorandum of understanding about the roles is worked out prior 
to the appointments being made. 
 
Box 11: High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
Article 18 TEU 
1.  The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the 
President of the Commission, shall appoint the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. The European Council may end his term of office by the same 
procedure. 
2.  The High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. 
He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as 
mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defence policy. 
3.  The High Representative shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council. 
4.  The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He shall 
ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. He shall be responsible within the 
Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other 
aspects of the Union's external action. In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, 
and only for these responsibilities, the High Representative shall be bound by Commission 
procedures to the extent that this is consistent with paragraphs 2 and 3. 
 
The HR will be assisted by a new European External Action Service (EEAS) composed of 
officials from the Council Secretariat, the Commission and seconded from Member State Foreign 
Ministries. This is another important innovation. Details of the arrangement still have to be 
worked out, but some preparatory work has taken place in cooperation between the current HR 
and the Commission. The EEAS is expected to reduce duplication and facilitate the development 
of a more effective external policy of the EU (UK, House of Parliament, 2008, pp. 63-66). 
  It is worth mentioning that the existing Commission Delegations in third countries and at 
international organisations will become EU Delegations. Many assume that they will become part 
of the EEAS. Diplomatic missions of Member States are required to cooperate with Union 
delegations (Art. 32 and 35 TEU). 
 
Box 12: European External Action Service 
Article 27 
(….) 
3.  In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European 
External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of 
the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General 
Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national 
diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European 
External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act 
on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after 
obtaining the consent of the Commission. 
 
The current instruments of CFSP are joint actions and common positions, introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty, and common strategies, introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. The distinction  16   
between the three can sometimes be difficult in practice. The Lisbon Treaty instead talks about 
general guidelines and decisions. This at least is a simplification. 
 
Box 13: Change in CFSP Instruments 
Nice Treaty (consolidated)  Lisbon Treaty (consolidated) 
Article 12 
 
The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in 
Article 11 by: 
—  defining the principles of and general 
guidelines for the common foreign and security 
policy, 
— deciding on common strategies, 
— adopting joint actions, 
— adopting common positions, 
—  strengthening systematic cooperation 
between Member States in the conduct of 
policy. 
Article 25 
(ex Article 12 TEU) 
 
The Union shall conduct the common foreign 
and security policy by: 
  defining the general guidelines; 
  adopting decisions defining: 
  actions to be undertaken by the Union; 
  positions to be taken by the Union; 
  arrangements for the implementation of the 
decisions referred to in points (i) and (ii); 
and by 
  strengthening systematic cooperation between 
Member States in the conduct of policy. 
 
The basic budget provisions of the Lisbon Treaty for CFSP remain the same as the current ones, 
where administrative expenses are charged to the Union budget, while operating expenses 
normally are charged to the Union budget, “except for such expenditure arising from operations 
having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides 
otherwise” (art. 41(3) TEU). Financing military and defence operations can thus potentially be a 
problem. The Lisbon Treaty tries to help by adding provisions for urgent financing, including the 
setting up of a start-up fund. 
 
Box 14: Budget provisions for CFSP 
Article 41 TEU 
(….) 
3.  The Council shall adopt a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing 
rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the 
framework of the common foreign and security policy, and in particular for preparatory activities 
for the tasks referred to in Article 42(1) and Article 43. It shall act after consulting the European 
Parliament. 
Preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article 42(1) and Article 43 which are not 
charged to the Union budget shall be financed by a start-up fund made up of Member States' 
contributions. 
The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, decisions establishing: 
  the procedures for setting up and financing the start-up fund, in particular the amounts allocated 
to the fund; 
  the procedures for administering the start-up fund; 
  the financial control procedures. 
When the task planned in accordance with Article 42(1) and Article 43 cannot be charged to 
the Union budget, the Council shall authorise the High Representative to use the fund. The 
High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this remit. 
 
  17   
Common Defence and Security Policy (CDSP) 
 
Common Defence and Security Policy (CDSP), which used to be called European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP), gets a more prominent place in the new treaty. The basic definition does 
not change much, but there is now a new emphasis on operational capacity including both civilian 
and military assets.  
 
Box 15: Scope of CSDP 
Treaty of Nice (consolidated)  Treaty of Lisbon (consolidated) 
Article 17TEU 
1. The common foreign and security policy 
shall include all questions relating to the 
security of the Union, including the progressive 
framing of a common defence policy, which 
might lead to a common 
defence, should the European Council so 
decide. It shall in that case recommend to the 
Member States the adoption of such a decision 
in  accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements. 
The policy of the Union in accordance with 
this Article shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of 
certain Member States and shall respect the 
obligations of certain Member States, which 
see their common defence realised in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under 
the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible 
with the common security and defence policy 
established within that framework. 
The progressive framing of a common defence 
policy will be supported, as Member States 
consider appropriate, by cooperation between 
them in the field of armaments. 
 
Article 42 
1. The common security and defence policy 
shall be an integral part of the common foreign 
and security policy. It shall provide the Union 
with an operational capacity drawing on 
civilian and military assets. The Union may use 
them on missions outside the Union for peace-
keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening 
international security in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter. The 
performance of these tasks shall be undertaken 
using capabilities provided by the Member 
States. 
2. The common security and defence policy 
shall include the progressive framing of a 
common Union defence policy. This will lead 
to a common defence, when the European 
Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It 
shall in that case recommend to the Member 
States the adoption of such a decision in 
accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements. 
The policy of the Union in accordance with this 
Section shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of 
certain Member States and shall respect the 
obligations of certain Member States, which 
see their common defence realised in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under 
the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible 
with the common security and defence policy 
established within that framework. 
 
The so-called Petersberg tasks, defined at a meeting of the Western European Union (WEU) in 
1992, and included in the EU treaties by the Amsterdam Treaty,  are extended to include joint 
disarmament operations, post-conflict stabilisation as well as “fight against terrorism, including 
by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” Both civilian and 
military means can be used. 
 
Box 16: Extension of ’Petersberg’ tasks 
Treaty of Nice (consolidated)  Treaty of Lisbon (consolidated)  18   
Article 17 
(….) 
2. Questions referred to in this Article shall 
include humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces 
in crisis management, including peacemaking. 
Article 43 
 
1.  The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), 
in the course of which the Union may use 
civilian and military means, shall include joint 
disarmament operations, humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, military advice and assistance 
tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping 
tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peace-making and 
post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may 
contribute to the fight against terrorism, 
including by supporting third countries in 
combating terrorism in their territories. 
 
The emphasis on operational capacity has led to the establishment of a European Defence 
Agency. In fact, this agency has already been established in 2004. 
 
Box 17: European Defence Agency (EDA) 
Article 42 
(….) 
3.  Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the 
implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives 
defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may 
also make them available to the common security and defence policy. 
Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency 
in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter 
referred to as "the European Defence Agency") shall identify operational requirements, shall 
promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where 
appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base 
of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, 
and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities. 
 
Flexibility Provisions in CFSP and CSDP 
 
The Lisbon Treaty will introduce more flexibility in CFSP, including CSDP. This is an important 
aspect of the treaty. 
First, the Lisbon Treaty allows for ‘enhanced cooperation’ in all areas, including 
CFSP and CSDP (Art. 20 TEU). The current treaty does not allow for ‘enhanced cooperation’ in 
defence.  Establishing enhanced cooperation will require a minimum of nine Member States (Art. 
20(2) TEU), against eight currently. Enhanced cooperation in CFSP, including CSDP, further 
requires unanimity in the Council (Art. 329(2) TFEU). 
 
Box 18:  Enhanced cooperation in CFSP 
Art. 329(2) TFEU 
(….) 
2. The request of the Member States which wish to establish enhanced cooperation between 
themselves within the framework of the common foreign and security policy shall be addressed to 
the Council. It shall be forwarded to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, who shall give an opinion on whether the enhanced cooperation proposed is  19   
consistent with the Union’s common foreign and security policy, and to the Commission, which 
shall give its opinion in particular on whether the enhanced cooperation proposed is consistent 
with other Union policies. It shall also be forwarded to the European Parliament for information. 
Authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation shall be granted by a decision of the Council 
acting unanimously. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty also introduces the new concept of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ in the 
defence area. This is considered an important innovation by many observers (e.g. Angelet and 
Vrailas, 2008). Contrary to ‘enhanced cooperation’ it does not require unanimity to be 
established, but a QMV. The idea is that Member States with greater willingness and capacity in 
the area of defence ‘shall’ go together in some kind of closer cooperation of a more permanent 
kind. This cooperation is geared towards increasing the military capabilities of the Member States 
and thus the Union. 
  
Box 19: Permanent Structured Cooperation 
Article 42 TEU 
(….) 
6.  Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have 
made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding 
missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such 
cooperation shall be governed by Article 46 [established by QMV, but governed by unanimity 
among participating states]. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43 [concerning tasks]. 
 
‘Constructive abstention’ mentioned above, and which is not new, can also be seen as a kind of 
flexibility, but more ad hoc. 
  More importantly, for the expanded Petersberg tasks, the Lisbon Treaty  mentions the 
possibility of entrusting “the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are 
willing and have the necessary capability for such a task” (Art. 44  TEU). Such a group is often 
referred to as a ‘coalition of the able and willing.’  
 
Box 20:  Entrustment of task to a group of states 
Art. 44 TEU 
1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may 
entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the 
necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among 
themselves on the management of the task. 
 
All in all there are now a number of flexibility provisions which can be applied in the areas of 
CFSP and CSDP. 
 
Mutual Defence and Solidarity 
 
A somewhat controversial new mutual defence or mutual assistance clause has been added to the 
treaties by the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 42 TEU). The language can resemble the collective defence 
articles of the WEU and NATO treaties. Notice the provisos though. The obligation of assistance 
“shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member 
States”, read non-aligned Member States. Further, commitments must be consistent with NATO 
commitments, a stipulation considered important by the more pro-Atlantic Member States, 
including the UK.  20   
 
Box 21: Mutual assistance clause 
Article 42 TEU 
(….) 
7.  If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member 
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in 
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. 
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the 
foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. 
 
Finally, we should mention the new mutual solidarity clause, which is part of the TFEU. This 
deals with terrorist attacks against Member States or natural or man-made disasters in Member 
States. The article asks for solidarity and mobilisation of all instruments, including military 
resources. This is the Union’s response to events like 9/11 in general and the terrorist bombings 
in Madrid and London in particular.  
 
Box 22: Mutual solidarity clause 
Article 222 TFEU 
1.  The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member 
State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union 
shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available 
by the Member States, to: 
  –        prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; 
  protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; 
  assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event 
of a terrorist attack; 
  assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a 
natural or man-made disaster. 
2.  Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or 
man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political 
authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council. 
 
 
Significance of Changes 
 
If ‘institutions matter,’ as claimed by many social scientists, the Lisbon Treaty should be 
expected to produce more efficiency and legitimacy in general and more coherence and 
effectiveness in the Union’s external action.  
  The extended use of the so-called ordinary legislative procedure involving the EP more 
should in principle produce more ‘input’ or procedural legitimacy. 
  The increased use of QMV in the Council should increase efficiency, which in turn may 
also be good for legitimacy to the extent that grid-lock can be avoided or at least be reduced 
(‘output’ legitimacy).  
             The new permanent President of the European Council should be able to give the EU 
more continuity and direction. 
The new triple-hatted HR should bring more coherence to external action. The EEAS and 
EDA are important new agencies that should help increase the capacity for external action, by 
providing information, analysis and increased capabilities. If the Member States are willing to use  21   
QMV the possibility is there in the treaty also for CFSP, although still based on preceding 
unanimity in the European Council, where the Union’s strategic interests are defined. In the end 
much will depend on the political will of the Member States. As long as unanimity dominates you 
have 27 veto points in EU-27, and you will have more in the future as the Union will move on 
and take in more Member States. 
  The EU is promising much in its treaties. The list of objectives, values and good 
intentions is long. But the Member States have ring-fenced CFSP in the Treaty. It remains 
intergovernmental. So the discrepancy between rhetoric and action will most likely remain 
considerable. Those who favour increased capacity for international action of the EU can hope 
that there will be a convergence of interests among the Member States. Interaction, actor 
socialisation and learning processes may gradually produce collective European identities among 
foreign policy decision-makers in Europe, which in turn may affect interests. But the rationale of 
collective action will then still have to be communicated to the European publics in a convincing 
way. 
  The Lisbon Treaty has also increased the possibility of some Member States going ahead 
without waiting for the laggards. Flexibility, multi-speed integration, in various forms, have 
contributed to the integration process in the past, so why not in other areas, including CFSP?  
Schengen cooperation started among a small group of five states. Today it involves most Member 
States. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) did not include all Member States at the outset, 
but the number of participating states has increased since 1999, when the single currency was 
introduced, and more Member States are expected to join in the coming years. This is why the 
increased possibility of flexibility in CFSP may also turn out to be a useful tool in the future. 
  In the area of defence in particular we know that things will only move once France and 
the UK have agreed and preferably Germany has joined. Then other Member States may 
‘bandwagon.’ The development of a common defence policy, made possible by the Treaty of 
Maastricht, only started after the historic meeting of minds at the Franco-British summit at Saint 
Malo in 1998 (see for instance Howorth, 2007). Then things suddenly moved very fast. But it 
may be that a kind of plateau has been reached now and that further incentives and instruments 
are needed. The Lisbon Treaty has added to the toolbox, but it cannot change the constraints of 
domestic politics. National leadership is also required. 
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